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The Projected Hong Kong Special Administrative  
Region Human Rights  
Record In The Post-British Era 
by 
Daniel C. Turck * 
Capital University Law School  
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong ceased to be a British Dependent Territory, and the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong pursuant to the 1984 
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration).1 The 
Joint Declaration, in accordance with Article 312 of the PRC's Constitution, declares that 
Hong Kong is now a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).3 
The HKSAR is under the authority of the PRC's Central Government but is expected to 
enjoy "a high degree of autonomy, except in respect of foreign and defense affairs," 
which are the responsibilities of the Central Government. Purportedly, Hong Kong's 
"capitalist system and life-style [will] remain unchanged for 50 years."4 
Inherent in Article 31 of the PRC's Constitution is the concept of "one country, two 
systems," an idea that would encompass both the PRC's socialist, as well as, Hong Kong's 
capitalist systems.5 Moreover, HKSAR law will preserve "rights and freedoms" that 
would be promulgated by the National People's Congress of the PRC and recognized "in 
a Basic Law of the HKSAR."6 After an arduous process,7 the Basic Law of the HKSAR 
was adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress of the PRC at its third session on 
April 4, 1990,8 and became effective on July 1, 1997. 
THE BASIC LAW OF THE HKSAR 
The Basic Law is a statute enacted under the authority of Article 31 of the PRC's 
Constitution, and its interpretation will be carried out in accordance with Chinese 
Communist Party policy. Hence, while the Basic Law is sometimes referred to as Hong 
Kong's "miniconstitution," the National People's Congress has the power to amend the 
Basic Law unilaterally. Article 5 of the PRC's Constitution provides that "no law or 
administrative rules and regulations shall contravene the constitution," and there is no 
provision for exempting or suspending Article 5.9  
The Joint Declaration served as the starting point for the necessary process of reform in 
developing constitutional and legal institutions required to maintain the rule of law, 
human rights and democracy in Hong Kong.10 However, a number of troubling issues are 
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present as it appears that provisions of the Basic Law either contravene the spirit or the 
black letter of the Joint Declaration.11  
For example, under article 39 of the Basic Law, the International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as, international labor 
conventions which already apply to Hong Kong, are to continue in force, and are to be 
implemented through the laws of the HKSAR. Although the rights and freedoms of Hong 
Kong residents may be restricted by law, the restrictions may not contravene their rights 
as set out in the aforementioned international treaties and enumerated in Chapter III of 
the Basic Law. Ultimate protection is dependent upon adequate implementation of the 
rights referred to specifically in Article 39 and those in the Basic Law under a system of 
constitutional judicial review. 
Further, under Article 67 of the PRC's Constitution, the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress is empowered to interpret the constitutionality of the PRC's 
laws and HKSAR legislation. Consequently, Hong Kong legislation may be deemed 
unconstitutional under the PRC's Constitution even though it may be consistent with the 
Basic Law.12 While the Basic Law is intended as the "mini-constitution" of the HKSAR, 
from the PRC's perspective, it must fit within the PRC's overall legal framework as any 
other domestic legislation.13 Although the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR is vested 
with the power of final adjudication,14 the common law applied by this court will be in 
direct conflict with the PRC's Constitution.15 
Therefore, the National People's Congress of the PRC can seemingly enact and apply its 
laws freely to the HKSAR under the authority of Article 18 of the Basic Law.16 Since the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has the vested power of ultimate 
interpretation,17 the independence of the judiciary can be compromised in perpetuating 
the rule of law and the common law system of the HKSAR. The Joint Declaration 
expressly provides that the HKSAR "courts shall exercise judicial power independently 
and free from any interference," and that the Court of Final Appeal "may as required 
invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit" on the court.18 However, the 
Joint Declaration appears to be once again undermined as, after years of dispute,19 the 
British Government gave way to the PRC's position that only one foreign judge could 
serve on the Court of Final Appeal.20 
THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS ORDINANCE OF 199121 
The United Kingdom ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter International Covenant) on May 20, 1976. At the time, the British 
Government accepted certain obligations in respect to all individuals, both within its 
territory and others subject to its jurisdiction, including the inhabitants of Hong Kong. 
The International Covenant was not offically incorporated into Hong Kong's domestic 
law at that time, although the United Kingdom took the position "that its provisions were 
effectively implemented through various laws in Hong Kong, including the common 
law."22 The rights afforded under the International Covenant were eventually officially 
recognized by the Hong Kong government in 1991 when the Bill of Rights Ordinance 
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was passed which incorporated the Covenant's Provisions. Again, Article 8 of the Basic 
Law now governing the HKSAR states that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong 
will remain in force. However, since the PRC opposed & objected to the passage of the 
Bill of Rights Ordinance, the law's viability and continuing constitutional judicial review 
of its protections is doubtful.23 
While the PRC is not a signatory to the International Covenant, the Joint Declaration 
provides that the International Covenant "as applied to Hong Kong" shall remain in 
force.24 Thus, pursuant to Article 40 of the International Covenant the PRC, as the 
HKSAR's governing body, will be responsible for filing human rights reports with 
respect to Hong Kong, with the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The PRC has 
already indicated that it will cease to file these reports after July 1, 1997.25 The world, 
and more importantly the people of Hong Kong must wait and see exactly what human 
rights they will be afforded under the PRC's new Basic Law governing the HKSAR. The 
one aspect which is certain, is that compared to the PRC's record on human rights, Hong 
Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance has provided a more positive human rights tradition.26 
THE PRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD27 
The PRC claims that universal human rights are representative of the "Western" liberal 
approach. A reading of the PRC's Constitution shows that Chinese citizens enjoy the full 
range of rights found in most western democracies.28 Human rights, on the other hand, 
are accepted in a slightly different light. During November 1991, the PRC's Information 
Office of the State Council issued a White Paper entitled "Human Rights in China," that 
begins with the following affirmation of the concept of human rights: 
As a developing country, China has suffered from setbacks while safeguarding and 
developing human rights. Although much has been achieved in this regard, there is still 
much room for improvement. It remains a long-term historical task for the Chinese 
people and government to continue to promote human rights and strive for the noble goal 
of full implementation of human rights as required by China's socialism.29 
The Chinese government is not alone in its goal of implementing human rights according 
to its ideology and political persuasion. Many governments support the notion of a 
version of human rights reflecting their own cultural, philosophical, political, ethical and 
economic traditions.30 Anne Bayefsky, a commentator on recent international 
conferences that have adopted declarations or action plans, notes that the role of cultural 
sovereignty and cultural relativism in the international human rights sphere can establish 
that the real interest of the state protagonists is not protection of cultural identity but non-
interference, supremacy, and control.31 
Bayefsky goes on to conclude: 
[u]ltimately the divergent strands of consent, contingency, positivety, efficacy, might, on 
the one hand, and justice, rationality, normativity, validity, right, on the other, must be 
mediated. It is the failure of contemporary legal philosophy to confront adequately these 
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deep fissures at the heart of the international human rights regime which is responsible 
for the crisis that relativism has wrought.32 
Despite the PRC's professed commitment to the advancement of what it perceives as 
human rights, history revels a tradition of human rights which the people of Hong Kong 
may find unwelcoming at best when compared to the protections afforded under British 
rule. This is best illustrated by examining how the PRC has responded to its dissidents, its 
political prisoners, and the media. 
The Voice of Dissent in the PRC 
Criticism of the PRC has come with a high cost, including banishment, imprisonment, 
and even torture. Regarding its views on banishment of its dissidents, the Chinese 
government's attitude is that this is basically, "a matter of China's internal affair."33 Thus, 
it was not surprising to discover as recently at the beginning of January 1995, a secret 
blacklist of forty-nine dissidents & former political prisoners who resided abroad and 
who were banned from re-entering the PRC.34 While other political activists were 
fortunate to avoid being banished from their country, they still faced the threat of 
indiscriminate imprisonment and punishment. 
For example, during May 1995, Amnesty International issued a report that exposed the 
Chinese government's practice of violent suppression of Tibetan pro-independence 
protesters over the past two years.35 The report described the practice of using torture in 
interrogations and punishment in labor camps for adults as well as children.36 
Interestingly, on May 15, 1995, forty-five prominent Chinese scientists and intellectuals, 
including Wang Ganchang, one of the leading scientists responsible for the development 
of China's nuclear weapons, petitioned President Jiang Zemin and Qiao Shi, Chairman of 
the National People's Congress, for the PRC's government to treat all "political thought 
and religious belief with the spirit of tolerance and never again regard individuals of 
independent thought and independent views as 'hostile elements' and submit them to 
repressive attacks, surveillance, house arrest and even detention."37 
A few days later, Liu Xiaobo, a literary scholar and critic, was taken into custody by 
officers of the Beijing Public Security Bureau as he was preparing to deliver a copy of the 
petition to a western news organization. The petition, signed by fifty-six writers, scholars 
and former pro-democracy student leaders, called upon the Communist Party leadership 
to bring new substantive political reforms,38 and release all those persons still in prison 
for their part in the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. 
As the sixth anniversary of the 1989 demonstrations for democracy in Beijing 
approached, various other arrests took place to curtail political activism. In fact, Chinese 
authorities took precautions throughout the country to prevent such dissent.39 At the same 
time, incarcerated political prisoners petitioned the National People's Congress for the 
release of other political prisoners.40 
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One prominent Chinese activist, Chen Ziming, who was confined to house arrest, wrote 
an open letter in which he called for the release of political prisoners.41 During June 
1995, Mr. Chen along with Harry Wu (Wu Hongda), a naturalized American who had 
spent nineteen years in Chinese gulags and entered China from Kazakhstan, were 
detained by Chinese authorities.42 On August 24, Mr. Wu was convicted in a Wuhan 
court of spying; he allegedly obtained state secrets, (among other allegations) and was 
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, but he was subsequently expelled from the PRC 
as punishment for his crimes.43 
In November 1995, fifteen dissidents chanced arrest and detention by writing an open 
letter to the National People's Congress asking for the release of Wei Jingsheng, who was 
still under arrest for sedition.44 A few weeks later, Mr. Wei was tried, convicted and 
given a 14-year sentence.45 Two days after Mr. Wei's trial, three of those persons who 
had signed the open letter were arrested and detained.46 The PRC was sending a strong 
warning to its citizenry through the Wei trial and the arrest of the three Wei supporters 
that it would not tolerate any open dissent.47 
Moreover, it is the practice in China for dissidents to be held in police custody for long 
periods of time without charges being brought. Once charges are in fact brought, 
punishment is swift and severe. There is little room in the process for the "Western" 
approach of justice. For example, in January 1996, Liu Xiaobo, an activist during the 
1989 student demonstrations, was released only after being held in police custody for 
eight months.48 Further, at the end of May 1996, it was reported that shortly after sending 
a petition to the National People's Congress calling for an official re-evaluation of the 
events surrounding Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the release of political prisoners, 
several of the petitioners were detained by the police.49 After being held by the police for 
months, two of the petitioners and others received administrative punishment of terms 
extending from one to three years, a process imposed by the police without the detainee's 
recourse to legal counsel or the courts. The detainees were ultimately sent to re-education 
labor camps.50 During July of 1996, it was reported that another dissident, Li Hai, who 
was arrested on May 31, 1995, waited in detention for a year on a charge of revealing 
state secrets before his trial, while another dissident, Xiao Biguang, who was arrested on 
April 12, 1994 and whose whereabouts were unknown to his family, received a sentence 
of three years through the police administrative process and was sent to a re-education 
labor camp.51 
Two dissidents, one who had the audacity to participate in the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations and the other for trying to commemorate the protest, were released during 
June 1996. In the case of the former after seven years in prison, and with respect to the 
latter following three years in a labor camp.52 
Recently, the chairman of the PRC's National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference, Li Ruihuan, explained the PRC's policy on dissidents 
as follows: "China allows different opinions.... Only when the criminal acts [freedom of 
expression] to sabotage social stability, national unity and unification are checked in 
accordance with the constitution and law, can normal social order be maintained and 
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people's interests be safeguarded."53 The dissident to whom Ruihuan refers above, Wang 
Dan was tried, convicted and sentenced to eleven years imprisonment on October 30, 
1996, for "plotting to subvert the Government" by critizing the Chinese government in 
foreign publications; the Chinese government makes no distinction between political 
speech or writing and concrete action, and both types of dissent are deemed to endanger 
state security.54 
Arrest, Detention, Political Prisoners, Prison Conditions and Torture in the PRC 
Although the PRC's record on arrest, detention of prisoners (including political 
prisoners), prison conditions and the use of torture by police and wardens is well 
documented,55 there was the hope that the Central People's Government would allow 
inspections of their prisons by the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) as was officially announced by 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in November 1993.56 However, on January 27, 1995, the 
Chinese government announced that it would not allow the I.C.R.C. officials access to its 
prisons.57 For its part, the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People's Congress adopted a Prison Law of the PRC.58 Nonetheless, concern over China's 
Laogai or "reform through labor" continued.59 At the same time, the United States 
continued its efforts in receiving information from the PRC on named prisoners of 
conscience, political prisoners, imprisoned religious believers and those eligible for 
medical parole.60 Moreover, in April and May of 1995, a shocking prison practice came 
to light before a United Nations working group on contemporary forms of slavery and 
before U.S. Senate hearings: the removal of organs of executed criminals to be sold for 
medical transplants in Chinese state-owned hospitals.61 
Another report released by Amnesty International in May, indicated that the Chinese 
authorities continued to employ arbitrary arrests and that administrative detentions were 
increasing.62 For example, in preparation for its hosting the Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing beginning on September 4, and the non-governmental organizations' 
forum on the same topic to be held outside of Beijing beginning on August 30, the 
Chinese govenment detained known dissidents.63  
Many dissidents were still being held without charges or trial, and if tried, unfair judicial 
proceedings were the norm. Mr. Wei Jingsheng, one of the most well-known dissidents of 
the PRC, who had been held in communicado by the authorities since April 1994, was 
finally charged on November 1995 with trying to overthrow the Chinese government.64 
Moreover, detainees and prisoners held in police stations, detention centers and prisons or 
labor camps were subject to torture and ill-treatment. 
Persistent criticisim of the PRC's human rights violations was slowly opening the door 
for reform. During October 1995, Harry Wu accused the World Bank of extending loans 
to the PRC for an irrigation project at Tarim Basin that would benefit several of China's 
forced labor camps in the vicinity.65 In response, the World Bank reported in December66 
that it spent six weeks reviewing 159 funding projects in China and refuted Mr. Wu's 
allegations. Mr. Wu's response to the World Bank report was that it "defies credulity."67 
By the end of 1995, through continued criticism like Mr. Wu's, a draft of amendments to 
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the PRC's Criminal Procedure Law was submitted to the 17th meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress. Proposed amendments included 
early access by those arrested to defense lawyers, changes involving police custody, trial 
procedures, and administration of a bail system.68 
In March 1996, Amnesty International released its report on human rights in China 
entitled No One Is Safe to coincide with a campaign to urge foreign businesses with 
investments in China to push for human rights reform.69 Subsequently, the National 
People's Congress passed two laws that reformed the criminal justice system. One law 
created the presumption of a defendant's innocence until proven guilty and set limits on 
how long the police could detain suspects. The second law improved access to defense 
lawyers for those in custody. Amazingly, the second law confirmed the right of 
administrative government departments to jail suspects without trial.70 
In April 1996 another problem was brought to light.71 It appears that a number of 
dissidents were rescued from China by Operation Yellowbird, a sort of underground 
railroad operated by an alliance of human rights advocates, and brought to Hong Kong. 
Several of these dissidents were waiting in Hong Kong to be offered asylum before the 
PRC would take control on July 1, 1997. 
Over the last several years, attempts were made through the Human Rights Commission 
of the United Nations to censure the PRC for its appalling human rights record. Despite 
some early optimism that China would be held internationally accountable,72 the PRC 
used a procedural rule to block a vote on the merits of the Commission's motion that 
expressed concerns about reports of violations of fundamental freedoms, including long-
term imprisonment of dissidents for non-violent acts, and the need for legal due process 
and a fair trial.73 
On May 27, 1996, Bao Tong, the only Communist Party official who opposed the PRC 
military assault on the pro-democracy demonstrators in the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
uprising, was released from prison after serving seven years. He had been convicted of 
leaking state secrets during the protests and of counter-revolutionary propoganda and 
incitement. He was also denied political rights for an additional two years and the right to 
speak on government policy for the same duration.74 
The PRC ratified the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment seven years ago.75 Despite this ratification, acts that 
are prohibited under the Convention still persist. One example should suffice. Soon after 
Chen Longde was sent to Leshan re-education Labor Camp in Zhejiang Province for 
three years for "endangering national security," it was reported that he was seriously 
injured after being forced to jump from a third floor prison walkway to escape a brutal 
beating. He had already been kicked, punched and beaten with electric truncheons by a 
senior prison official. Mr. Chen's face was cut and bruised, he had a compound fracture 
of his upper femur, and had three teeth knocked out from his ordeal. Apparently, the 
prison officials insisted that Mr. Chen write a self-criticism and Chen replied he would 
rather "write a letter of appeal to protest his sentence."76 
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On April 28, 1996, the PRC began a nationwide crackdown on crime called "Strike 
Hard." In the first two months of the crackdown on crime, 1,000 people were executed.77 
China has made 68 crimes punishable by death, more than any other country. Anmesty 
International reported that during 1995 the PRC executed 2,535 people, and about 2,050 
in 1994.78 If it can be acknowledged that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights79 of 
1948 is regarded as an expression of customary international law, and there is only an 
implicit recognition of what international human rights law has designated as "the right to 
life,"80 the death penalty81 as carried out by the PRC is an unjustified derogation of the 
principle. At the very least, China should not impose the death penalty without rigorous 
procedural safeguards. 
Free Flow of Information: The Media82 
In April 1994, Xi Yang, a Hong Kong reporter, was sentenced to twelve years in prison 
by a PRC court for allegedly "stealing state secrets." Mr. Xi simply reported, as did seven 
other Hong Kong publications, in Hong Kong's Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao, 
information regarding gold sales and interest rate moves by the People's Bank of China. 
Moreover, Mr. Xi's source of information was the Bank's own deputy director of external 
affairs. 
In January 1996, the Chinese government, citing national security considerations, 
announced that Chinese customers such as banks and brokerage houses were forbidden 
from acquiring economic information from foreign news organizations. Henceforth, the 
foreign news service organizations were required to submit the information to the official 
Chinese Xinhua news agency for approval.83 
During September 1996, the PRC's Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, announced a 
new policy to strengthen ideological control over mainland electronic media. An annual 
censorship report covering eighteen criteria was instituted to avoid or remedy "political 
accidents."84 At the opening meeting of the Fifth National Council of the All-China 
Journalists Association in Beijing during October, Ding Guangen, a high ranking Chinese 
Communist Party official and member of the Central Committee Secretariat, stressed the 
necessity of maintaining a correct media orientation along Deng Xiaoping's theory of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.85 
Further, the Chinese government expanded its censorship by blocking domestic access to 
hundreds of Internet web sites that it considered politically sensitive. Among those 
blocked were United States newspapers such as The New York Times, The Los Angeles 
Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. The Cable News Network 
(CNN) web site was also blocked, as were sites of human rights groups such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch/Asia and organizations that covered Tibetan, 
Taiwanese or Hong Kong information.86 
Moreover, there was already in place a form of Hong Kong's media censoring itself in 
advance of Hong Kong's return to the PRC.87 While Hong Kong has no specific rules 
governing the operation of foreign journalists, the PRC does require foreign 
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correspondents to obtain PRC accreditation. For example, the PRC exercises restrictions 
on the movement of journalists, as they need approval from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to work away from their assigned base. In April 1995, PRC officials made it clear 
that no change would occur regarding freedom of the press in Hong Kong.88 
At times, an outright refusal to accredit a particular journalist89 or journalists from a 
particular Hong Kong newspaper90 have been utilized by the Beijing government. During 
June 1996, Lu Ping, the Chinese official charged with setting up Hong Kong's new 
government after July 1, 1997, made a number of statements to suggest that freedom of 
the press in Hong Kong could not remain unbridled.91 Anxiety by those in the Hong 
Kong media was expressed at the end of June in a joint report issued by the Hong Kong 
Journalists' Association and the London-based rights group, Article 19.92 The new 
Chinese News Agency, Xinhua, makes certain that Hong Kong's chief newspaper editors 
and reporters are aware of the difference between "advocacy and reporting."93 Hong 
Kong reporters have had first hand experiences with restrictions on carrying out their 
assignments in the PRC.94 Only time will tell if such restrictions will only increase under 
the new law of the HKSAR. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the PRC is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Beijing government agreed to send observers to the October 23, 1996, 
meeting of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations at Geneva to hear the 
report on Hong Kong's human rights record.95 
The PRC has shown itself to be intolerant of dissent. What implications are there for the 
people of Hong Kong as the PRC resumes its sovereign control? Recently, Qian Qichen, 
the PRC Foreign Minister, in an interview with the Asian Wall Street Journal, suggested 
that Hong Kong media would be banned from putting forward personal attacks on the 
Chinese leaders. He indicated that dissidents would not be able to engage in political 
activities which interfered in the affairs of mainland China. Hong Kong would no longer 
be able to mark the anniversary of Tiananmen's pro-democracy demonstrations of 1989.96 
Subsequently, the PRC Foreign Ministry, reiterated that Hong Kong residents would have 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, but that such liberties would have to operate 
within the law. Obviously, the Foreign Minister was not contemplating the laws 
protecting these freedoms set out in Article 3(5)97 of the Joint Declaration and Article 
2798 of the Basic Law. 
The "leaking of state secrets" regarded by the PRC as subversion or counterevolutionary 
activity has been used in China to arrest or detain and/or bring dissidents to trial. The 
Basic Law of the HKSAR contains provisions that can be interpreted to curtail all 
guarantees of freedom of expression. Will the passing of information on detainees or 
political prisoners in Hong Kong by Hong Kong residents, to foreign human rights 
groups such as Human Rights Watch/Asia be permitted? What will be a state secret in 
Hong Kong?99 
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The world will be watching to see whether the two systems are functioning in the one 
country, and whether the Hong Kong courts continue to operate without interference so 
that the rule of law remains a benchmark of the HKSAR.100  
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1 The Joint Declaration, a treaty, has been reprinted in: A Draft Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong 23 INT'L. 
LEG. MAT., 1366 (1984). [hereinafter Draft Agreement]. This international agreement 
comprises The Joint Declaration, Annex I "Elaboration by The People's Republic of 
China of its Basic Policies regarding Hong Kong," Annex II "Sino-British Liaison 
Group," and Annex III "Land Leases." Id. Ratifications were exchanged on May 27, 
1985, and the treaty was registered with the United Nations (UN) on June 13, 1985, 
pursuant to article 102 of the UN Charter. There was also an Exchange of Memoranda 
between the two governments in Peking on the day of signing the Joint Declaration, Id. at 
1381. The Joint Declaration entered into force on May 27, 1985. 
2 Article 31 provides: "The state may establish special administrative regions when 
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be 
prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in light of the specific 
conditions." LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 945, 950 (Ralph H. 
Folsom & John H. Minan, eds. 1989). 
3 Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1371, para. 3(1). 
4 Id. at 1373, Annex I, para.I. 
5 For a discussion of the origin of "one country, two systems" and China's defined policy 
toward Hong Kong in this regard see ENBAO WANG, HONG KONG, 1977: THE 
POLITICS OF TRANSITION, 42-50 (1995). It is anticipated by the PRC that the Hong 
Kong model would be used for the reunification of Macao and Taiwan with the Chinese 
mainland. Id. at 51-60; see also Denis Chang, Towards a Jurisprudence of a Third Kind - 
"One Country, Two Systems," 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 99 (1988). 
6 Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1372-73 para. 3(12) & Annex 1. 
7 For highlights of the drafting process of the Hong Kong Basic Law, see MING K. 
CHAN, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: REALPOLITIK IN THE MAKING OF THE 
HONG KONG BASIC LAW, 1985-1990, reprinted in THE HONG KONG READER 
PASSAGE TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY, 8 - 40 (Ming K. Chan & Gerard A. 
Postiglione, eds. 1995). For a review on how the drafting process undermined the 
confidence of the people of Hong Kong, see MING K. CHAN, DEMOCRACY 
DERAILED: REALPOLITIK IN THE MAKING OF THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW, 
1985-90, in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND 
PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY 3 (Ming K. Chan & David J. 
Clark, eds., 1991). 
8 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (1990), is found in PUBLIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 81 
(Andrew Byrnes & Johannes Chan, eds. 1993); see also Patricia Homan Palumbo, 
Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong 
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Kong: What Do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CONN. J. 
INT'L L. 667 (1991).  
9 Article 5 of the PRC Constitution provides inter alia "[a]ll acts in violation of the 
constitution and the law must be looked into." LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, 
supra note 2, at 947. Thus, there would be a constitutional duty to investigate any 
possible violation. Moreover, Article 62(2) and Article 67(1) provide constitutional 
power to enforce the constitution. Id. at 955-57. 
10 See generally MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN 
HONG KONG, ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC LAW (1990). 
11 See WANG, supra note 5, at 117-23; DAVIS, supra note 10, at 313-17; Peter Wesley - 
Smith, Law in Hong Kong and China: The Meshing of Systems, 547 ANNALS 111-15 
(1996); Anna M. Han, Hong Kong's Basic Law: The Path to 1997, Paved with Pitfalls, 16 
HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L.REV. 321, 325-35 (1993).  
12 Article 17 of the Basic Law states in part:  
[I]f the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress . . . considers that any law 
enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in conformity with the provisions of this 
Law regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Authorities or regarding the 
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, the Standing Committee 
may return the Law in question but shall not amend it. Any law returned by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress shall immediately be invalidated.... 
PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 87. 
13 See Zhang YouYu, The Reasons for and Basic Principles on Formulating the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region's Basic Law, and Its Essential Contents and Mode 
of Expression, 2 J. CHINESE L. 7 (1988); see also Han, supra note 11, at 326-28. 
14 PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 84-99 (arts. 2, 11, 18, 19, 82, 85); Draft Agreement, 
supra note 1, at 1371-73 para. 3(3) & Annex I para. I & III. 
15 Basic law, Article 158 reads in part:  
[I]f the courts ... need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are 
the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the relationship 
between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the 
judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their final 
judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions 
from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress . . . . [W]hen the 
Standing Committee makes an interpretation ... the courts of the Region ... shall follow 
the interpretation of the Standing Committee . . . . 
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PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 112-13. 
As to the application of the common law in the HKSAR, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH, 
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND IN THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGION, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997 : ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 5 
(Raymond Wacks, ed., 1993). 
16 PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 87. Article 18 provides: "[T]he Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress may add or delete from the list of laws in Annex III." 
Id. If "turmoil" in the HKSAR endangers "national unity or security," the Central 
People's Government can apply relevant national laws in the Region. Id. at 87-88. How 
broadly will "turmoil and national unity or security" be defined by the Central People's 
Government? 
17 Id. at 112. It is also evident that "acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs" are 
excluded from any Hong Kong court's jurisdiction under the authority of Article 19 of the 
Basic Law. Id. at 88. The PRC government has the power to determine whether a matter 
involves "foreign affairs" or "defense" as these terms are not defined in the Basic Law. 
Article 19 reads in part: 
[T]he courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no jurisdiction 
over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall 
obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state 
such as defense and foreign affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of 
cases. This certificate shall be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the 
Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the Central People's 
Government. 
Id. 
For a further insight into the operation of Article 19 see Han, supra note 11, at 329-32; 
see also Britain and China Agree on a Future Court for Hong Kong, N. Y. TIMES, June 
10, 1995, § 1, at 4. 
18 Draft Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I & III at 1373-80. On June 9, 1996, the Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group (created pursuant to the Joint Declaration) signed an 
Agreement on the Court of Final Appeal; see Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Introductory 
Note, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, 35 INT'L LEG. 
MAT. 207 n.1 (1996) for the text of the Agreement. The Ordinance is reproduced at page 
210. 
19 See Leung, supra note 18, at 208-09 (discussing the Sino-British dispute involving the 
Court of Final Appeal); see also Wang, supra note 6, at 164-67; Ming K. Chan, 
PRECARIOUS BALANCE : HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-
92, 189-91 (1994).  
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20 See Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Worries Over Fate of Legal System Under 
Chinese Rule, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1995, at A12. Agreement on various issues 
concerning the Court of Final Appeal was reached on June 9, 1995; see S. China Morning 
Post, June 17, 1995, at 1 (for Democrats pledge to fight against `sell-out' by Britain Court 
deal a boost to confidence). 
21 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 entered into force on June 8, 1991. 
PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 218. For a review of the development of the Bill of 
Rights and references to discussion of the individual rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights, see id. at 217.  
22 JOHANNES CHAN & YASH GHAI, A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS in THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 1 (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai, eds. 1993). Professor Ghai notes that not 
the whole of the International Covenant was adopted as the United Kingdom had made 
several reservations excluding several provisions. Id.; see Geping Rao, The Application 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to Hong Kong, 2 PAC. RIM 
L. & POL'Y J. 9 (1993). 
23 See No Kwai-Yan & Chris Yeung, 'Bill of Rights must go'; China Backs Proposal to 
Remove Statute's Power to 'Override' Legislation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19, 
1995, at 1.; see also Michael Davis, Time to Remember Old Promise, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1995 at 18. 
24 Draft Agreement, supra note 1, Annex I, & XIII at 1377. 
25 See Reports on Rights Must Not Stop: UN, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 4, 
1995, at 1. During October 1996, the UN Human Rights Committee indicated that it 
would ask the United Kingdom to report again before July 1, 1997, on the progress made 
with the PRC over future monitoring and reporting required under the International 
Covenant. See David Wallen, Un Rights Panel to Ask Britain for Progress Report, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 1996, at 8. Apparently, the U.K. was asked by the 
Committee to continue to report on the human rights situation in Hong Kong after July 1, 
1997. Id. Obviously the British would encounter numerous obstacles from the PRC in 
complying with such a request. David Wallen, UK Told to Watch Rights after 1997, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24, 1996, at 4. 
26 See Chan & Ghai, supra note 22, at 16-33; see also Davis, supra, note 11, at 320-21. 
27 See generally, Human Rights Watch, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 
1996 140-48 (1995)(events of 1995) (reviewing the PRC's human rights practices over 
the last several years); see also Human Rights Watch, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
WORLD REPORT 1995 142-49 (1994)(events of 1994); U.S. Dep't. St., COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 574-
612 (Joint Comm. Print 1996); U.S. Dep't St., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 555-73 (Joint Comm. Print 
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1995); Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration's Response to China's Human 
Rights Record: At the Half-Way Point, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 19-30 (1995). 
28 The 1982 PRC's Constitution was adopted by the Fifth Session of the Fifth National 
Peoples Congress on Dec. 4, 1982. XIANFA [Constitution](1982). The PRC's 
Constitution is translated into English and available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLASI 
File; see LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, supra note 2, at 945. The Constitution as 
amended on March 31, 1993 is found in PUBLIC LAW, supra note 8, at 122. 
29 State Council White Paper on Human Rights, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 8, 
1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLASI file. An excellent analysis of the 
PRC's attitude towards human rights as found in the White Paper is found in ANN 
KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBSISTENCE: CHINA AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 222-30 (1993); see Guo Luoji, A Human Rights Critique of the Chinese Legal 
System, 9 HARVARD HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1996) (examining the Chinese Communist Party 
& the Chinese government). 
30See Michael C. Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND CHINESE VALUES 3 (Michael C. Davis, ed. 1995); see also Melanne 
Andromecca Civic, A Comparative Analysis Of International and Chinese Human Rights 
Law-Universality Versus Cultural Relativism, 2 BUFFALO J. INT'L L. 285 (1995-96); 
Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West 
Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641 (1996); Christina M. Cerna, East Asian Approaches To 
Human Rights, 2 BUFFALO J. INT'L L. 201 (1995-96) (elaborating on the diverse views 
and approaches to human rights); Michael C. Davis, Human Rights In Asia: China And 
The Bangkok Declaration, 2 BUFFALO J. INT'L L. 215 (1995-96); Bilahari Kim Hee 
P.S. Kausikan, An East Asian Approach To Human Rights, 2 BUFFALO J. INT'L L. 263 
(1995-96); Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 
HUM. RTS. Q. 316 (1996). 
31 Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: 
New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996); see Christina M. Cerna, 
Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights 
in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994) (presenting a recent 
survey of the universalism vs. cultural relativism debate in the context of various 
international instruments). See also Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, And The 
Interest In Rights In China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359 (1995) (for a philosophical 
discussion that seeks common ground while reserving the differences). 
32 Bayefsky, supra note 31, at 59. 
33 This was the response by the PRC Foreign Ministry in response to international 
appeals for release of the political prisoner Wei Jingsheng after almost one year of his 
detention without being charged. INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, March 31, 1995, available 
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.  
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34 Jane Macartney, Beijing Bans 49 Dissidents from Returning, REUTERS NORTH 
AMERICA WIRE, Jan. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS News Library, ARCNWS File 
(specifically mentioned were Bei Dao, Wuer Kaixi, Chai Ling, Fang Lizhi and Li 
Shuxian). The document called "List of Overseas Members of Reactionary Organizations 
Currently Subject to Major Control" was issued by the Chinese Public Security Ministry 
in May 1994. For more information, see Secret Blacklist Against Overseas Chinese 
Dissidents is Published, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, ARCNWS File. 
35 Ai Accuses China of Human Rights Violations in Tibet, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, May 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
36 Id. 
37 Patrick E. Tyler, China is Urged By its Scientists to Ease Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 1995, at A1; see id. at A6 for excerpts from the petition. The petition was drafted by 
physicist Xu Liangying; a translation of the petition is found in The May 15 Petition, 94 
CURRENT HISTORY 264 (Sept. 1995). 
38 Patrick E. Tyler, China Arrests Prodemocracy Petitioner, N. Y. TIMES, May 20, 
1995, at 4. Others were arrested or detained as a consequence of this petition; see Police 
in China Arrest Two More Dissidents, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at A5. The 
petitioner, Wang Ganchang, in offering support, is reminiscent of Andrei Sakharov's 
open opposition to former Soviet Communism. 
39Chinese Police Broaden Crackdown on Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, at 9; 
see China Torture, Human Rights Abuse up in Last Year, REUTERS WORLD 
SERVICE, May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Human 
Rights Watch/Asia released a report to outline among other abuses, that dissidents were 
beaten, mutilated, and submitted to shocks while in police custody. Id.  
40 See, e.g., More Chinese Political Prisoners Petition Parliament for Freedom, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
ARCNWS File. 
41 Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Quiet, but Dissidents' Agenda Gathers Strength, INT'L. 
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS file. 
42 Elaine Sciolino, In Warning to U.S., China Cracks Down on 2 Dissidents, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 1995, at A8. Mr. Wu was accused of illegally obtaining China's state 
secrets and conducting criminal activities. Id. By July 17th, U.S. officials had not been 
given access to Mr. Wu. See Carroll Bogert and Karen Breslau, Human Rights: Trouble 
for an Abrasive Angel, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995, at 31; see also Elaine Sciolino, 
China's Prisons Forged Zeal of U.S. Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1995, at A1 
(describing Mr. Wu's backgound); Seth Faison, China Says Detained American Rights 
Advocate Admits Falsifying TV Documentaries, N. Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at A6 
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(describing China's attempt to discredit Mr. Wu); Jane Macartney, China Frees Wife of 
Jailed Dissident, Bans Visit, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Oct. 27, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (with respect to Mr. Chen). 
43 See Seth Faison, Chinese Convict Harry Wu as Spy and Order Him Out, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 1995, at A1; see also Daniel Southerland, Man on a Mission: Ouster May Force 
Activist to Change Style, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 25, 1995, at A1. Following his 
return to the United States, Mr. Wu testified before the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights, Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House 
of Representatives. See Hearing of the Int'l Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee 
of the House International Relations Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 9, 
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
44 Dissidents Demand Wei's Release; 15 Risk Detention by Signing Appeal, 
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at A33. 
45 Liu Qing, China's Show Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A31. Mr. Wei was 
arrested on April 1, 1994 a short time after meeting with Assistant Secretary of State John 
Shattuck. He was held in detention until his trial on Dec. 13, 1995; see also Beijing's 
Account of Trial and Sentence in Wei Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A20. A 
profile on Mr. Wei is found in Patrick E. Tyler, Red Guard Who Chose Democracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A20. Some of Mr. Wei's letters from his earlier period of 
incarceration, written to family members and to China's national leaders were smuggled 
out of the PRC and came to light in February 1996. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Letters of 
Chinese Dissident are Defiant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at 9. Portions of these letters 
appear in Wei Jingsheng, Letters to Deng, from the Pit of Repression, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 1996, at 7.  
46 China Arrests Three More Dissidents, U.P.I., Dec. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, ARCNWS File. Those arrested were Wang Donghai, Chen Longde and Fu 
Guoyong. Id. 
47 Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Sends a Strong Warning With Long Sentence for Dissenter, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A1. 
48 Dissident Detained 8 Months is Freed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1996, at A10. Another 
activist, Wang Dan, was held in detention at a secret police center for 17 months before 
charges were filed against him for consipracy to overthrow the government. Patrick E. 
Tyler, A Leader of '89 China Protest Held on Subversion Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
1996, at 1. His activities that led to the charges included publishing anti-government 
articles abroad, raising money to support needy dissidents and accepting a scholarship 
from the University of California. Id. 
49 See Chinese Police Arrest Two Dissidents, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, May 30, 
1996, at 2 (Wang Donghai and Chen Longde); see also Chinese Police Question More 
Rights Advocates, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, May 31, 1996 at 4 (Wu Gaoxing and 
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Zhao Wanmin); Chinese Police Detain Veteran Dissident Wang Xizhe, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
50 Chinese Dissident Gets Three Years in Labor Camp, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, 
Aug 3-4, 1996 at 4 (Chen Longde, Wang Donghai and Yao Zhenxian); Chinese Dissident 
Gets Three Years, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 1996 at 4 (Yao Zhenxiang). 
Before the end of August, Mr. Chen was reported to have been beaten and was in the 
hospital from a fall to avoid a further brutal beating. See Chinese Dissident Tortured, 
Badly Injured after Fall, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 27, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
51 Chinese Dissident Accused of Revealing State Secrets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
July 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
52 China Releases Dissident after Seven Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at 
A10 (Ren Wanding and Zhang Xianliang). 
53 Chinese Official Li Ruihuan Explains Beijing's Dissident Policy, BBC SUMMARY 
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
ARCNWS File. 
54 See Tyler, supra note 48, at 1; see also Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese Verdict Points to an 
Era of Harsh Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at A1. 
55 See Turack, supra note 27, at 24-30; Christine Button, Democracy Behind Bars: 
Forced Labor In The Chinese Prison System: Past, Present, And Perspectives On The 
Future, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 181 (1996); see also HARRY WU & CAROLYN 
WAKEMAN, BITTER WINDS: A MEMOIR OF MY YEARS IN CHINA'S GULAG 
(1994); Jonathan M. Cowen, One Nation's "Gulag" Is Another Nation's "Factory Within 
A Fence": Prison-Labor In The People's Republic Of China And The United States Of 
America, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 190 (1994); Albert Hung-yee Chen, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, 153-68, (1992) (respecting the PRC criminal procedure and other procedures for 
taking persons into custody). 
56 Patrick E. Tyler, Red Cross Says the Chinese are Seriously Discussing Prison Visits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at 3. 
57 Jeffrey Parker, China Says No to Free Red Cross Prison Visits, REUTERS WORLD 
SERVICE, Jan. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLASI File. For its part, 
the I.C.R.C. wanted "unfettered, unaccompanied visits with any prisoner in any prison at 
any time to ensure that interviews are candid, open and unrehearsed." Id. U.S. officials 
continued to press Chinese officials to allow prison visits by the Red Cross or other 
humanitarian organizations. See China Defends Human Rights Record, U.P.I., Jan. 19, 
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
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58 Law on Prisons and Treatment of Prisoners, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS, Dec. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLASI File (for 
an English translation of the text of the Prison Law of the People's Republic of China); 
China Scraps Title "Labour Reform for Prisons," REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 7, 
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. See also China Introduces New 
Prison Laws, U.P.I., Dec. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLASI File 
(providing a brief summary of the changes). 
59 See A.M. Rosenthal, Laogai Thrives, Its Products Sell, Its Slaves Suffer On, INT'L. 
HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
During March 1995, a Tibetan monk, Palden Gyatso, testified before the UN 
Commission on Human Rights about Chinese prison conditions, treatment of prisoners 
and the use of torture. On April 3, 1995, Mr. Gyatso testified before the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights, International Relations Committee, House, 
U.S. Congress. Three Decades in Chinese Prisons and Labor Camps in Tibet, FEDERAL 
NEWS SERVICE, April 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File 
(testimony by Mr. Gatso concerning his life in Chinese prisons). 
60 U.S. Still Presses China on Pisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at A22 (letter to 
editor from John Shattuck, Secretary of State). 
61 Stephanie Nebehay, China Denies Taking Organs from Executed Prisoners, 
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, April 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
ARCNWS File; Catherine S. Manegold, China is Said to Sell Executed Inmates' Organs, 
N. Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A10. One of the persons giving evidence before the U.S. 
Senate hearing was a former member of China's Public Security Bureau while another 
was a former political prisoner. Id. 
62 Amnesty International, Six Years After Tiananmen: Increased Political Repression 
and Human Rights Violations (1995); see Amnesty Blasts China's Crackdown on 
Dissent, U.P.I., June 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. See 
also Gao Yu's Award Wanton Interference, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 2, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (for the Chinese reaction to the 
report). 
63 See, e.g., Chinese Said to Detain Dissidents as Parley Nears, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
1995, at A3; Beijing Deports American as Spy and He Flies Home, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 1995, at A1. 
64 See Patrick E. Tyler, China Charges Leading Dissident With Trying to Overthrow 
Regime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at A1; see also Patrick E. Tyler, Is Top Dissident 
Even Alive? Beijing Will Not Say, N.Y. Times, March 31, 1995, at A6. Miss Tong Yi, 
Mr. Wei's secretary, was detained on April 4, 1994, and spent two and a half years 
incarcerated in the PRC's re-education through labor program. Jane Macantney, China 
Dissident Freed after 2 Years Labour, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct 3, 1996. 
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65 Daniel Southerland, Wu Says World Bank Funds Forced Labor; Activist Links 
Loans to Chinese Work Camps, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1995, at A13.  
66 Sarah Jackson-Han, World Bank Denies Loans Used in Chinese Forced Labor, Prison 
Camps, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
ARCNWS File. 
67 Id.; see Daniel Southerland, World Bank Denies Loans Benefit Chinese 'Gulag', 
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1995, at A41. On April 4, 1996, Mr. Wu released a report 
alleging the same claim as previously alleged, but the World Bank refused to support an 
independent investigation of his allegation. See Wendy Koch, World Bank Said to Be 
Funding China Enforcers; Ex-political Prisoner Wu Decries Backing of Quasi-military 
Organization, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, April 4, 1996, at A2. 
68 Daniel Kwan, NPC to Amend Legal System, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 24, 
1995, at 6. 
69 Ron Corben & Angeline Oyog, China-Human Rights: Amnesty Warns of Beijing 
Lobby Blitz, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, ARCNWS File. 
70 See China's Parliament Widens Defendant's Rights, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, 
March 18, 1996, at 4. However, the administrative practice has continued. See Jane 
Macartney, China Dissident to Serve 3 Years in Labor Camp, REUTERS WORLD 
SERVICE, Oct. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Patrick E. 
Tyler, Champion of Democracy in China Draws 3-Year Sentence, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1996, at A4 (both describing how one dissident was taken into custody on October 9, 
1996, and the next day received an administrative sentence of three years in a re-
education labor camp). 
71 See Melinda Liu, Still on the Wing, NEWSWEEK, April 1, 1996, at 44; see also 
Richard Ingham, Time Runs out for Hong Kong as Haven for Chinese Dissidents, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
ARCNWS File. Some of the dissidents who were helped to gain asylum via Hong Kong 
were Wang Xizhe, Wu'er Kaixi, Chai Ling, Li Lu, Wan Runnan and Yan Jaiqi. Tan Ee 
Lyn, China Dissident Flees to Hong Kong, May Go to U.S., REUTERS WORLD 
SERVICE, Oct. 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Wang 
Xizhe was able to enter the United States as a person admitted "for emergency reasons or 
for those in the public interest. " Michael Dobbs, With Eye on China, U.S. Admits 
Dissident, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 17, 1996, at 5. 
72 European Union to Take China to Task over Human Rights, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, April 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File; see EU Joins 
U.S. In Condemning Chinese Human Rights Record, EUROPEAN REPORT, April 3, 
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. 
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73 Barbara Crossette, China Outflanks U.S. to Avoid Scrutiny of its Human Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 24, 1996, at A12. In 1995, for the first time, Europe and the United States 
succeeded in putting the PRC on the Commission's agenda. Id.  
74 Patrick E. Tyler, China Frees Official Jailed after '89 Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1996, at A7. Since his release, Mr. Bao has been in isolated detention where he has been 
denied visitors other than his immediate family. See Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese Aide, 
Released from Prison, Is Still Held in Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at A7. He 
has not been allowed a medical examination, nor to contact a lawyer to challenge his 
detention. Id. 
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